Water Law Review
Volume 6

Issue 1

Article 49

9-1-2002

State ex rel. Dept. of Parks & Recreation v. Schoendorf, No.
H022039, 2002 WL 972147 (Cal. Ct. App. May 10, 2002)
Arthur R. Kleven

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.du.edu/wlr

Custom Citation
Arthur R. Kleven, Court Report, State ex rel. Dept. of Parks & Recreation v. Schoendorf, No. H022039, 2002
WL 972147 (Cal. Ct. App. May 10, 2002), 6 U. Denv. Water L. Rev. 212 (2002).

This Court Report is brought to you for free and open access by the University of Denver Sturm College of Law at
Digital Commons @ DU. It has been accepted for inclusion in Water Law Review by an authorized editor of Digital
Commons @ DU. For more information, please contact jennifer.cox@du.edu,dig-commons@du.edu.

WATER LAW REVIEW

Volume 6

designations under the WCVP. The reasons included: the facility
would not create a land use problem, the site had adequate
circulation, water distribution, sewage collection and utility service,
and the location would notjeopardize public health, safety and welfare
or the facility was necessary to ensure public safety and welfare. The
project satisfied all the requirements under the WCVP, therefore the
court held it was consistent with the WCVP.
The court affirmed the District's decision and concluded the EIR
adequately described the project's environmental setting and scope,
adequately analyzed the project's impacts on groundwater quality and
reasonable alternatives, and Milliken failed to show the project was
inconsistent with zoning or land use laws.
Susan Curtis
State ex reL. Dept. of Parks & Recreation v. Schoendorf, No. H022039,
2002 WL 972147 (Cal. Ct. App. May 10, 2002) (holding: (1) a claim of
adverse use cannot be supported where a water right was used with
implied permission that was never expressly disclaimed; and (2) a
property owner may only rely on an overlying water right to extract
water from the ground beneath the owner's property, not to divert
surface flow to which the owner has no riparian right).
The Schoendorfs appealed an action alleging they illegally diverted
surface flow of a spring from land owned by the State of California.
Schoendorf claimed prescriptive and overlying rights to the spring.
On summary adjudication, the Monterey County Superior Court ruled
in the state's favor. Schoendorf appealed, alleging the trial court
erred in failing to infer adverse use and improperly adjudicating their
overlying right claim. The California Court of Appeal for the Sixth
District affirmed the trial court's ruling.
The surface flow of the spring arose on the state's land and only
reached Schoendorf's property by means of a springbox and pipeline.
From 1944 to 1954, Schoendorf's predecessor in interest used this
diversion to supply their property with water. The state gained title to
the waters of the spring and surrounding land in 1962. In 1996,
Schoendorf installed a new springbox and pipeline on the state's land
after acquiring neighboring property.
In 1999, the state brought an action against Schoendorf alleging
they were illegally diverting water from the spring. The state also
claimed sole riparian rights to the spring because without the
diversion, no water from the spring would reach Schoendorf's
property. The state sought removal of the diversion and restoration of
its property, as well as a declaration that Schoendorfs diversion was
illegal. Schoendorf filed a cross-complaint seeking declaratory relief.
They alleged a prescriptive right to the spring based on adverse use by

Issue I

COURT REPORTS

their predecessor in interest. Additionally, they claimed an overlying
right to the spring because their property overlaid the water that is the
spring's source. The state moved for summary judgment, claiming
Schoendorf asserted no defenses to the state's causes of action, and
their claims of prescriptive and overlying rights to the spring were
without merit. In opposing the motion, Schoendorf argued the state
did not establish Schoendorfs use of the spring was permissive.
Although claiming an overlying right, Schoendorf did not allege this
right provided a defense to the state's claims or constituted an
independent ground for their own causes of action. The trial court
granted the state's motion and subsequently entered judgment
declaring that Schoendorf had no right to the spring. The judgment
also prohibited Schoendorf from diverting water from the spring.
In their appeal, Schoendorf claimed the trial court erroneously
failed to infer adverse use of the spring by long term occupants of the
property ("Lopez family"). They argued even if evidence suggested
the owners knew the Lopez family used the spring, the use was adverse
because it occurred without the owner's express permission. In
affirming the trial court's ruling, the court relied upon well-established
principles of California law. A party claiming tide by prescription
bears the burden of proving the use was open, notorious, continuous,
adverse, and uninterrupted for a period of five years. If property is
used with express or implied permission of the owner, the use is not
adverse. Schoendorf only presented evidence suggesting the Lopez
family used the spring without express permission, not that this use
was adverse.
Undisputed evidence established that the state's
predecessor in interest ("Brown") was aware the Lopez family used the
springbox and pipeline to divert spring water to their property. At one
time, Brown employed members of the Lopez family, and even had
them maintain the Browns' pipelines, including the pipeline in
question. Brown also directed Mr. Lopez to dismantle other pipelines
carrying water elsewhere. The court considered these facts strong
evidence to support the trial court's inference that Brown permitted
the Lopez family to use the spring.
Schoendorf also claimed that even if permissive use was established
between 1944 and 1954, the state did not prove permissive use at any
other time. Rejecting this argument, the court again relied on a wellestablished principle of state law: "Where a use is initially permissive, it
remains so unless its permissive character is expressly disclaimed."
Schoendorf offered no evidence the Browns ever disclaimed
permissive use of the spring. The state established that use of the
spring was permissive at least as early as 1944, and remained so until
the state acquired the land in 1962.
Also at issue on appeal was whether the trial court erred in
summarily adjudicating Schoendorf s counterclaim asserting an
overlying right to the spring water. Schoendorf argued the state never
expressly sought adjudication of Schoendorf's overlying rights claim
and this claim was relevant to the relief sought by the state. In
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affirming the trial court's ruling, the court briefly noted that in its
summary judgment motion, the state asserted there was no merit to
Schoendorf's causes of action. The court also concluded the trial
court was not required to resolve the overlying rights claim because it
was not a matter of controversy and immaterial to both parties' causes
of action and relief sought.
A landowner possesses exclusive riparian rights to a spring if the
natural flow of the spring does not cross the boundaries of the land on
which it is located. Similar to a riparian right, an overlying water right
is appurtenant to land; however, an overlying right only confers the
right to extract water from the ground underneath the owner's land.
The court stated that an overlying right does not permit a landowner
to trespass onto a neighbor's land to divert water from a spring to
which the landowner has no riparian right. Therefore, the court
reasoned if Schoendorf did possess an overlying right to extract water
from underneath their own land, that right would not entitle them to
divert that water from the state's property. Neither would this right
allow Schoendorf to avoid an action to remediate a wrongful diversion.
Hence, the overlying rights claim was immaterial to the state's causes
of action. Further, Schoendorf only alleged the overlying rights claim
entitled them to extract groundwater, not that this right entitled them
to install the springbox and pipeline. The state never challenged
Schoendorf's right to extract groundwater from underneath the state's
property; therefore, this claim was not a matter of controversy. Thus,
the court also concluded the overlying rights claim did not provide a
basis for Schoendorfs causes of action and declaratory relief sought.
In sum, the court affirmed the lower court's determination that
Schoendorf did not have a prescriptive right to the state's spring,
because under California law, using property with implied permission
is not considered adverse use, and permissive use remains so until
expressly disclaimed. The court also held the trial court properly
adjudicated Schoendorf's overlying right claim. In doing so, the court
reaffirmed prior California decisions holding that a property owner
may only rely on an overlying water right to extract water from the
ground beneath the owner's property, not to divert surface flow to
which the owner has no riparian right.
ArthurR. Kleven

